“Bien faux” and “Portrait vivant”: Portraits, Mirrors and Representational Strategies in L’Astrée

by

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Y esto no os paresca mal, que si de vuestra hermosura vistes sola la figura, y yo vi lo natural.

Jorge de Montemayor, La Diana 90.

If the early seventeenth century, a time of transition and upheaval, is marked by the erosion of an old epistemological order and its gradual replacement by new systems of signification, such shifts become evident in products of representation. Similitude becomes conjoined with illusion, and formerly reliable means of representation become fertile terrain for trickery and subsequent error.¹ Honoré d’Urfé’s great pastoral romance, L’Astrée, participates in the general triumph of illusion characteristic of the early seventeenth century (Ehrmann 72-86); procedures of visual trickery become universal in this unfinished pastoral romance whose author repudiates representation before the spectator’s scrutinizing eye in favor of the auditor’s less discerning ear.² Mirror and spectacle are implicated in the reversibility of the visual and the auditory in d’Urfé’s novel (Harth IC 39); in the mirror of L’Astrée’s enigmatic clefs, aristocratic readers searched for their own portraits, akin to the amusements practiced in fashionable salons such as Mme de Rambouillet’s (Harth IC 40). Foucault suggests that confusion of mirror and portrait informs the epistemic shift of the early seventeenth century;³ in L’Astrée, specular imagery evolves from conventional representation of feminine beauty to conjunction of mirror image and instrument of reflection in the slippery character of Alexis. The construction of specular imagery in L’Astrée derives from the Renaissance notion of “an analogic imagination” (Harth IC 40); in this study, I propose an evolution of representational strategies founded on the interplay between portrait and mirror: the analogical mode of thought is exploited in order to trace the contours of a new means of representation. Central
to the inauguration of the representational process which results in the union of portrait and mirror is manipulation of authoritative indices of truth. Two such instruments which ought to reveal truth are the magical fountain contained within the walls of the Palais d’Isoure gardens, which serves a reflective end analogous to that of the maiden’s looking glass. The Fontaine de la Vérité d’Amour serves as a magical source which both attracts and repels: while its renown for facile divulgence of truth in love draws many an amatory pilgrim to the fabled region of Forez, the fierce lions and unicorns that guard its entrance keep all comers at bay. The venerated Druid priest Adamas, in his interpretation of an obscure oracle aimed at two such frustrated lovers, establishes a relationship of substitutive equivalence between the Fountain and “le temps, les services et la perseverance” (3: 208), postulating by false induction that all things that reveal truth in love also may be called the Fountain. In lieu of the Fountain’s clear revelations, lovers must rely on the very circumstances which drove them to seek supernatural succor in the first place, that is, the tenuous and ambiguous substantiation of amatory fidelity by words and actions.

Before perpetual enchantment renders the Fontaine de la Vérité d’Amour inaccessible, its mode of operation reveals the importance accorded both portrait and mirror, for it is at once a reflecting pool and a delimiter of countenance. Created by a magician whose daughter died for an unrequited love (1: 448), the Fountain reveals the onlooker’s spirit rather than his corporal presence: its waters of disclosure reflect not the subject, but the object of his affection. The Fountain reveals truth in love in a negative manner, for truth must be deduced once falsehood is unmasked:

. . . par la force des enchantements l’amant qui s’y regardoit, voyoit celle qu’il aimoit, que s’il estoit aimé d’elle il s’y voyoit auprès, que si de fortune elle en aimoit un autre, l’autre y estoit représenté et non pas luy, et parce qu’elle descouvroit les tromperies des amants, on la nomma Verité d’Amour.
(1: 37)
If the loved one harbors affection for no one, her solitary visage confronts the onlooker with disarming derision. The story of Damon and Fortune, depicted in a painting housed in a grotto which bears their names, illustrates the potential for duplicity inherent in blind faith in the Fountain’s revelations.

The learned Druid Adamas provides the gloss necessary for comprehension of the series of six paintings portraying the unhappy end of Damon and Fortune. Priding himself on his insensitivity to love’s pangs, Damon incurs the wrath of Cupid, who punishes the proud shepherd by forcing him to succumb to the charms of the beautiful shepherdess Fortune. Their blossoming “amour reciproque” (1: 444) is menaced by the monstrous desire of Mandrague, the aging and horrific sorceress who covets the young Damon and schemes to undermine his love for Fortune so that she may have him to herself. As the most accomplished of necromancers, Mandrague is able to surpass for a time the powers of the magician who created the Fountain, and to thwart its veritable revelations. In order to provoke the couple’s consultation of the Fountain’s waters, Mandrague inflicts upon each of them disturbing nightmares of infidelity. Damon’s vision kindles the ever-present embers of doubt which lie dormant in all lovers, and he hastens to the Fountain at daybreak in order to find reassurance. He finds instead the face of Maradon next to Fortune’s, and commits suicide in despair. When Fortune looks into the doubly-enchanted waters in her turn, she sees Mélide’s face next to Damon’s and is enraged at his infidelity, until she finds him bleeding to death: she then expires with him out of desplaisir. The faithful shepherd’s blood gushes forth from his wound like the waters of a pent-up source (1: 450), and replaces the treacherous Fountain — which discloses for the pair “menterie” instead of “vérité”— with the ultimate proof of love’s truth. Upon gazing into the deceptive aquatic mirror, both Damon and Fortune discover their own absence, as the Fountain signifies disloyalty in its failure to reproduce their images side-by-side. The moment of death supplants in its turn the conjunctive physiognomy rendered as absence by the doubly-bewitched Fountain. Damon and Fortune recognize in the end their reciprocal fidelity: the pair’s final portrait of steadfast love supersedes the Fountain’s perfidious representations.
When it operates as it should, the “Fontaine de la Vérité d’Amour” illustrates clearly Michel Foucault’s notion of the Renaissance ideal of ressemblance: the signifiant, or lover who gazes into its waters, finds his signifié in the reflection he contemplates. This image may be decoded by a fixed set of verbal interpretations, necessary for comprehension of the mirror’s enigmatic reflection. Foucault remarks the value accorded verbal interpretation in the doubling of mirror image by words: “Les reflets muets sont doublés par des mots qui les indiquent” (42). The Druid who guards the Fountain and casts the spell which obscures its clarifications explains to the knights Guyemants and Clidaman that the Fountain provides a material representation of the onlooker’s spirit — that is, the object of his adoration — rather than the duplication of his own corporal features plainly visible to all. Through its reflective properties, the Fountain effectively circumvents the obligations of the representational world, which require comprehension via “représentations corporelles;” the detour of magical source provides venue to the otherwise inaccessible “substances incorporelles” (3: 267). Manipulated by Mandrague and then cordoned off by the malicious conspiracy of Druid guardian and spiteful knight, the Fountain’s inaccessibility allows for the development of a new kind of mirror.

In a gesture which underscores the subversion of mirror image, the inconstant Hylas, adroit at manipulating both word and image, effects a miniature reproduction of Mandrague’s enchantment of the Fountain as looking glass, as mediator of “truth.” Returning to the interrupted epic of his amatory adventures, Hylas tells his pastoral auditors of his simultaneous affection for Florice and Dorinde: already enamored of Florice, the wayward Hylas is struck by Dorinde’s beauty. Hylas and Périandre, Dorinde’s hopeful suitor, become inseparable companions, and “les deux amis” proffer “les serments reciprocues d’une fidelle et parfaite amitié” (2: 143-144) on the Tomb of the Two Lovers. Such an eternal vow is no match, however, for the inconstant’s roving eye and competitive streak, since he finds himself drawn to Dorinde by rivalry with his best friend: “mon affection prit beaucoup plus de violence par la contrariété de Periandre” (2: 145), he admits. Resolving to distract Périandre from his love for Dorinde so that he may have
may have her to himself — for a time, at least — Hylas resorts to an ingenious "ruze," justified by the latitude in trickery permitted all lovers: "en amour toutes finesse sont justes" (2: 146), recalls the inconstant.

Just as Mandrague cast a spell on the Fountain so that Damon would be free from Fortune, in order to disenchant Périandre with Dorinde, Hylas has an elaborate hand-mirror fabricated, taking care to adorn it with intricate decorations that increase its value and beauty. He seeks the services of the celebrated portraitist Zeuxide, "[se] [faisant] peindre le plus au naturel qu’il fut possible," and inserts his likeness "entre la glace et la table d’or qui la soutenoit" (2: 146). Dorinde’s father purchases the mirror from a merchant and offers the ornate object to his daughter as a gift. Fascinated with its novelty, the unsuspecting maiden wears the mirror about her waist, as Hylas desires.

Paralleling Damon’s dream of Fortune’s infidelity, Hylas then tells Périandre that his hopes for Dorinde’s love are unfounded, and that she is passionately in love with the inconstant, though she dissimulates her affection so well in public that no one realizes her secret. As proof of his contention, and to show that it is no “conte inventé” (2: 147), Hylas instructs Périandre to shatter the glass of the mirror and to remove the paper, beneath which he will find Hylas’s portrait, and the truth of his beloved’s betrayal. Like the troubled Damon, who hurries to the Fountain to confirm or refute his nightmare, Périandre rushes to Dorinde’s home in order to ascertain truth in love from a looking glass. Périandre follows the inconstant’s directives, and full of amorous despit, abandons Dorinde to the whims of Fortune and the infidelities of his “plieurs compagnons” (2: 149), whom Dorinde roundly accuses of perfidy and inconstancy. Unlike Mandrague’s plot-gone-awry, Hylas’s scheme succeeds, for with Périandre out of the picture, he wins Dorinde’s love, and keeps it, for a short while.

Dorinde’s mirror functions as does the doubly-enchanted Fountain: Périandre’s consultation of its charms yields not the truth, but a deception that passes for truth. This subterfuge permits Hylas to attain his goal of wresting Dorinde’s affection from his best
friend/rival. The inconstant’s artifice highlights the composite nature of the mirror, an object more apt to be handled because of its compact size, “de la grandeur de la main” (2: 146). The looking glass is more than the glass itself or the reflection it displays: it comprises accessory ornamentation and a support for the crystal, “la table d’or qui la soustenoit” (2: 146). Not only the glass itself, but the other component parts of the mirror, are subject to handling and fraud. The fracturing of Dorinde’s mirror reveals an anamorphic layering: one image conceals another whose surreptitious presence passes undetected until revealed by a gesture which obfuscates the primary image. Underlying the instrument of feminine vanity, which ought to cast back the lovely traits of she who gazes at it, is the portrait of deception — that is, the ultimate truth. Like the Fontaine de la Vérité d’Amour, the mirror is rendered useless, supplanted by Hylas’s image. By analogy with the legendary mirror of the Fountain, the portrait of deception becomes the manifestation of truth in love, like time, service and perseverance. Hylas’s manipulation of Dorinde’s looking glass haunts the ostensibly veritable revelations of “le temps, les services et la perseverance,” always subject to a fraud akin to the inconstant’s.

The hand-mirror fashioned by Hylas conjoints looking glass and portrait, and suggests that the portrait informs the mirror image, serving as part of its support and decoration. The inconstant’s scheme to win Dorinde’s love exposes the portrait beneath mirror imagery, figuring the representational equation of looking glass and portrait: “Le peintre se mettra à l’école de l’optique géométrique afin que la surface plastique joue un rôle de représentation identique à celui du miroir” (Lytard 208). Specular representation, as rendered by the Fontaine de la Vérité d’Amour, takes on the attributes of the portrait, for the mirror image delimits the onlooker’s face and reproduces his traits. If during the seventeenth century, “the value of the portrait lay in its putative resemblance to the original” (Harth “IVP” 17), then the well-executed rendition of the subject’s face ought to produce a nearly-exact replica.

This presumed fidelity to original justifies the portrait’s donation as amatory “faveur,” and as replacement for the loved one during her hiatus. Céladon, for example, wears Astrée’s portrait in a
locket around his neck; together with his packet of letters, the ribbon he wrested from Astrée’s frock just before his plunge into the Lignon, and a bracelet fashioned from her hair, the portrait constitutes the “peu de chose [qui] luy restoit de tant de faveurs” (1: 66). During the blissful time of the reciprocal demonstration of their affection, Céladon inscribes on the reverse side of his mistress’s image-in-miniature a phrase which summarizes the portrait’s substitutive virtue: “Privé de mon vray bien, ce bien faux me soulage” (2: 275). The dictum proves true during Céladon’s exile in the deep woods, where all his thoughts turn to his lost happiness with his shepherdess. Céladon bemoans his great misfortune, lamenting: “maintenant . . . tu n’as plus que des biens imaginaires, les autres t’ayans esté ravis par la personne mesme de qui tu les tenois” (2: 276). The absence of Céladon’s “vray bien” — that is, the fleshly presence of Astrée — is mitigated by the supplément of “bien faux” — that is, Astrée’s likeness enclosed within the shepherd’s locket.

The outline of Astrée’s countenance contained by the locket exemplifies the Renaissance system of ressemblance according to Foucault: the link between Astrée herself and her representation is guaranteed by the visible similarities which reflect her spiritual perfection. The portrait acts as a mnemonic device that aids Céladon in reconstituting the presence of his beloved; he engraves her image in his memory:

j’ay non seulement les traits de son visage si bien gravez en la memoire, qu’il me semble qu’elle est toujours devant mes yeux, mais aussi son parler et ses façons de faire me sont tellement en l’ame, qu’il faut avouer que rien ne me peut divertir ny separer d’elle, et me figurant à tous coups de la voir devant moy, il me semble que sa parole de mesme me frappe toujours aux oreilles. (2: 328)

Through the artistry of imagination, Céladon deceives his senses into maintaining the illusion of Astrée’s presence: her corporal beauty is conjoined in his memory with the cadence of her utterances.
It is this image, etched in Céladon’s heart and duplicated in his locket, that serves as the basis for the life-size reproduction of Astrée that will figure in the shrine ostensibly dedicated to the goddess whose name she shares. Céladon, ignorant of the techniques of painting, lends the cherished locket to Adamas so that he may have Astrée’s likeness copied. The painting will fill in the blank space over the altar, supplementing the inscription of her name (2: 328). When the shepherds and shepherdesses of Forez stumble upon the Temple of Astrée in their sylvan outing, they are dazzled by this accompaniment to the inscribed poetry in the edifice. Myrtle boughs are entwined above the representation of a shepherdess “à [la] hauteur [d’Astrée]” (2: 185), which mirrors in exacting detail its model who stands before it.

Astrée can only gaze upon her reflection with “admiration;” her bewilderment augments as she reads the rondeau which complements her specular image. In this poem, traced by the recognizable hand of Céladon, the inscription figuring on the back of Astrée’s portrait repeats itself at the end of each stanza of six lines, in which Céladon laments his fate of banishment all the while signaling his joy at worshipping the features before which his presence is forbidden. The shepherd circumvents his beloved’s original decree of exile by idolatrous adoration of the representation of her attributes, no mere “image,” but “dieux tres grands.”10 Céladon’s “vray bien” and his “bien faux”—the model and its reproduction—oppose one another in a play of specular identity. “Voilà le portrait d’Astrée,” observes Phyllis; “je n’en vis jamais un mieux fait, ny qui luy ressemblast d’avantage” (2: 185). Despite the faithful duplication of her features, however, Astrée herself is not the model for her mirror image; her miniature portrait, zealously guarded by Céladon in his locket, serves as prototype for the amplified and verisimilar version of his mistress. The painting figuring above the altar is a representation of a representation, and announces in its doubling of representation the binary disposition of the sign.11 While the large-scale portrait of idolatry is linked to its smaller replica, Astrée’s palpable appearance obscures the miniature as the mediating model: it fails to represent “en elle-même ce lien,” and to arrive at the two-part disposition characteristic of the Classical representation of the sign (Foucault 79). The refrain of
the rondeau—an instance of poetic amplification corresponding to the portrait’s enlargement—designates the partition between “vray bien” and “bien faux,” made manifest by the shepherdess’s presence before her likeness. Astrée’s portrait in the temple dedicated to her holy namesake may be viewed as a transitional stage between Renaissance *ressemblance* and Classical binarity: the requisite interiority of representation with respect to its bond is impeded by the exteriority and separation invoked by Astrée’s bodily presence in the Temple. The time between Céladon’s dive into the river Lignon and his assumption of the disguise of Alexis serves as preparation for the eventual absorption of his character into that of the Druidess, converting his empty shell into the raw material of Adamas’ ingenious work of art. This preliminary stage is characterized by Céladon’s self-avowed status as “vaine idole” and “ombre vaine”: a shadow cast by no one, a sign emptied of its content, a mere hollow shell of his former self. As he admits to Adamas, who finds him in the forest, he is no longer himself, for he serves only as a memorial to his past capacity for affection: ce que vous voyez devant vous, ce n’est plus Céladon, fils d’Alcippe et d’Amarillis, que le grand druide Adamas a autrefois tant favorisez de son amitié, mais seulement une vaine idole que le ciel conserve parmy ces bois pour marque que Celadon sceut aymer (2: 317). The commemorative function of his state signals the virtual evacuation of one of the avatars of Renaissance *ressemblance*: if the sign’s content is revealed by interpretation of an exterior “marque” (Foucault 57), then Céladon’s declaration divulges his shell’s constitutive vacuity. From this empty space, Adamas will begin to mold the contours of his subsequent creation. Scheming out of self-interest to exert continued influence on the virtual hermit, Adamas begs Céladon’s permission for frequent visits: the priest insists that Céladon resembles closely his daughter, sequestered for many years to come at the Druidess convent of the “filles Carnutes.” Though Alexis resembles Céladon only “un peu,” Adamas assures the former shepherd that he perceives in his countenance “un pourtrait vivant de ce que j’aime le plus au monde” (2: 319). Céladon thus becomes the living representation of an absence, and an ostensible replacement for the missing daughter. According to Adamas’ hyperbolic persuasions, Céladon repre-
sents Alexis; soon the feigned Druidess, in her turn, will represent
the departed shepherd to his former companions. Adamas’ verbal
manipulations craft the optical illusion of mutual representation;
like the procedures of artistic anamorphosis, his handiwork is “une
destruction pour un rétablissement, une évasion mais qui implique
un retour” (Baltruaitis 5): the Druid obliterates Céladon in order
to replace him with Alexis and effect his eventual reunion with Ast-
trée. The success of the Druid’s scheme depends upon the consen-
sus of Céladon’s peers in the matter of his death: the ceremony
over his cenotaph (2: 349-350) effectively seals his fate. The past-
toral community’s steadfast belief in Céladon’s demise aids
Adamas in successfully deploying the travesty of Alexis. Adamas
conceives the temporary ruse of dressing Céladon in his daughter
Alexis’ vestments in order to facilitate the desired reunion with
Astrée. To lend credence to the fabrication, Adamas will say that
Alexis was obliged to return home from the “filles Carnutes” be-
cause of illness. When Céladon objects that regardless of travesty,
he will still be Céladon and therefore will disobey Astrée, Adamas
circumvents the shepherd’s protestations by pointing out that she
never forbade that he be Céladon, but only that he allow himself to
be seen by her: “Or elle ne vous verra pas en vous voyant,” he rea-
sons, “mais Alexis” (2: 398). Céladon’s continued observance of
Astrée’s decree thus relies on substitution of the representational
guise of Alexis for the shepherd’s prohibited presence. Adamas
argues that if the petulant shepherdess recognizes him, he can hope
for nothing less than death; Céladon’s desire to seek passive expi-
ration prompts him to hand over his will to the Druid and his
strategems: “je remets entre vos mains et ma vie et mon contente-
ment: disposez donc de moy comme il vous plaira” (2: 398). Cé-
ladon’s resignation to the Druid’s designs marks the completion of
his evacuation as Céladon, and his readiness for the change in
clothing that signals change in identity. When the shepherds of
Lignon visit Adamas’ home to congratulate him on the return of
his daughter and to request that he perform the ceremony of
thanksgiving for the cultivation of mistletoe in their hamlet, all are
deceived by Céladon’s new clothes. Lycidas is struck by the re-
semblance between his departed brother and Adamas’ daughter;
the narrator makes clear that Alexis’ robes constitute only a dis-
guise for Céladon: “aussi tost que Lycidas mit les yeux sur son frere, il demeura longtemps sans les en pouvoir retirer, car il luy sembla d’abord de voir le visage de Celadon” (2: 431). Though Lycidas observes that Alexis’ mannerisms, as well as the traits of her face, correspond exactly to those of Céladon, he is convinced of the veracity of the artifice by circumstances and the authorizing voice of Adamas, despite the contrary evidence before his eyes:. . . l’opinion qu’il avoit que [Céladon] fust mort, l’authorité du druide qui disoit que c’estoit sa fille, et l’abit de nymphe qui l’embellissoit, et le changeoit un peu, l’empescherent d’en découvrir la verité, et luy faisoient démentir ses yeux” (2: 432).

The “milieu” that guarantees Lycidas’ misprision is comprised initially of consensus—the “opinion” he shares with his peers on the evidence of Céladon’s demise. The other elements of the distorting veil are the authorizing words of Adamas and Alexis’ dress. This three-part instrument of deception corresponds to Hylas’s composite hand-mirror designed to dupe Dorinde: the “glace” of consensus is bolstered by the testimony of Adamas, just as the reflective glass of the mirror is supported by Hylas’s portrait. The robes worn by Alexis, affirming her fake identity, are analogous to the devious looking glass’s ornamentation, which encouraged Dorinde’s ill-fated display of its finery. Hylas’s manipulation of the hand-mirror not only replicates the second enchantment of the Fountain, but provides a model for optical subterfuge, suggesting that the conjunction of “opinion,” “authorité” and “habits” forms a sort of mirror which hinders ocular apprehension of truth. Adamas’ niece Léonide, for her part, has Lycidas recount digressive stories, lest he discover his brother under the borrowed clothing. Léonide knows that in order for her uncle’s ruse to succeed, Alexis must pass the hurdle of the shepherds’ initial impression, and that Lycidas’ reports to the others will in turn determine general approbation with regard to Alexis’ identity. Preoccupation with the stunning resemblance between shepherd and Druidess diverts apprehension of the ephemeral truth, allowing resemblance to be filtered through “le commun consentement de tous” and to be accepted as truth:. . . après [la premiere veue], son jugement estant desja preoccupé par ceste opinion de ressemblance, il ne pourroit si bien découvrir la verité, et que mesme le rapport qu’il en feroit
aux bergers et bergeres de sa cognoissance, feroit presque le mesme effect aux autres (2: 455). Resemblance between Céladon and Alexis leads not to decipherment of the truth, but down the path of error, soon to be sanctioned as truth by the validating voice of public opinion. The evidence of resemblance acts not as manifestation of an inner truth compelling exegesis, but as a beacon that deflects and misdirects, blocking access to truth. When Lycidas relays to the shepherdesses, including Astrée, the shepherds’ visit to Adamas’ dwelling, he employs metaphors of representational artifice to describe Alexis’ resemblance to Céladon: “representez-vous le visage de feu mon frere, quand il estoit en sa plus grande beauté,” he responds to the shepherdesses’ avid inquiries, “car elle luy ressemble de sorte, que je ne vis jamais pourtrait qui ressemblast mieux à un visage, ou pour mieux dire jamais miroir ne représenta rien plus naïvement” (2: 564).¹³ Like the hand-mirror fashioned by Hylas, Alexis is perceived as both portrait and mirror of Céladon. Representation of Céladon through the mirror of Alexis is discerned as naïve, that is, without artifice; the hand of the artisan remains concealed. The subterfuge of Adamas and Léonide, based on an anamorphic optical illusion, goes undetected, as feint and disguise are taken for unmediated reality.

The acceptance of erroneous appearances as incontrovertible truth abets the eventual transparence of the sign, incarnated by Alexis’ designation as “portrait vivant de Céladon” (3: 598). Alexis reflects Céladon’s traits like a mirror: as specular image of Céladon and as simultaneous instrument of his reflection, the character of Alexis, a work of art conceived of ruse in the shadow of Céladon’s empty tomb, marks the collapse of ressemblance into signifié. Alexis thus embodies the doubling of representation crucial to the binary disposition of the sign: “dès qu’une représentation [Alexis] est liée à une autre [“le portrait vivant de Celadon”] et représente en elle-même ce lien, il y a signe,” contends Foucault (79). Alexis, herself a product of representational artifice, is assimilated not to Céladon, existing only as absence, but to the “portrait vivant de Celadon.” Unlike the portraits that hang in commemorative stasis on the walls of Adamas’ house, Alexis joins the pastoral society, and in her fluid movement becomes the living representation of Céladon: she evokes by her presence the link
between her and Céladon’s likeness. Because the means of representing Céladon and his eventual representation are identical, and because for the pastoral entourage, the artifice of Alexis’ character is imperceptible, the sign becomes lucid with respect to its content. The mediating element of Adamas’ craft vanishes: “entre le signe et son contenu, il n’y a aucun élément intermédiaire, et aucune opacité,” asserts Foucault (80).

The weight given to social approbation lends credence to the transparent qualities of the sign: the pastoral society confers the status of truth upon disguise. Manipulation of portraiture throughout L’Astrée justifies the shepherds’ seemingly implausible acceptance of feint for unmediated reality, for resemblance deflects rather than facilitates access to an ephemeral truth.

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NOTES

1 Michel Foucault notes the ludic “parenté nouvelle de la ressemblance et de l’illusion;” this transitional period becomes “le temps privilégié du trompe-l’œil, de l’illusion comique, du théâtre qui se dédouble et représente un théâtre, du quiproquo, des songes et visions” (65). Erica Harth discusses the notion of imitation as mediation and verisimilitude as an interposition between art and nature, producing “the semblance of truth” (IC 27). Timothy J. Reiss traces the shift from the analogic “discourse of patterning” (51) which leaves contradictions unresolved and “analytico-referential” discourse based not on analogy but on identity (31).

2 In “L’Autheur à la Bergere Astrée” (the liminary remarks preceding Part I of the novel), d’Urfé reminds his pastoral creation: “je ne represente rien à l’œil, mais à l’ouye seulement, qui n’est pas un sens qui touche si vivement l’ame” (1: 8).

3 In his essay on Velásquez’s Las Meninas, with regard to the central representation of the royal parents —which appears to be another in the series of paintings figuring on the wall— Foucault points out: “Mais ce n’est pas un tableau: c’est un miroir. Il offre enfin cet enchantement du double que refusaient aussi bien les pe-
intures éloignées que la lumière du premier plan avec la toile ironique” (22-23).

4 Adamas passes abruptly from the particular to the general, basing his subsequent valid syllogism on an example of “les fausses inductions par lesquelles on tire des propositions générales de quelques expériences particulières” (Arnauld 280; pt. 3, § 20, 4).

5 The enchantment that blocks access to the Fountain is imposed by the Druid charged with its care and the spiteful knight Clidaman, frustrated by the Fountain’s revelation of Sylvie’s love for no man, including him. The Druid, in collusion with Clidaman—who provides the fierce lions and unicorns which will stand vigil over its entrance—renders the Fountain inoperable for an unspecified period of time (1: 93). Later, it is said among the shepherds of Forez that in order that the spell be removed, bloody sacrifice—that is, “le sang et la mort du plus fidèle amant et de la plus fidèle amante qui se puissent trouver”—is required (2: 206).

6 “Voylà la bergere assise contre ce rocher couvert de mousse, et voicy Damon qui tient la teste en son giron, et qui pour luy dire le dernier adieu, luy tend les bras et luy en lie le col, et semble s’efforcer et s’eslever un peu pour la baiser, cependant qu’elle, toute couverte de son sang, baisse la teste et se courbe pour s’approcher de son visage et luy passe les mains sous le corps pour le souslever un peu” (1: 452).

7 Myriam Yvonne Jehenson observes that in this pictorial tale’s conclusion, “illusion triumphs over reality and both lovers die” (149), declining to remark the pair’s final double portrait of steadfast love. “Reality,” that is, the linear order, ultimately vanquishes “illusion,” the realm of the supernatural.

8 “[T]out ainsi que les autres eaux representent les corps qui luy sont devant, celle-cy represente les esprits. Or l’esprit qui n’est que la volonté, la memoire et le jugement, lorsqu’il aime, se transforme en la chose aimée; et c’est pourquoi lors que vous vous presentezy icy, elle reçoit la figure de vostre esprit, et non pas vostre corps, et vostre esprit, estant changé en Silvie, il represente Silvie, et non pas vous. Que si Silvie vous aimoit, elle seroit changée aussi bien en vous, que vous en elle; et ainsi en representant vostre
esprit vous verriez Silvie, et voyant Silvie changée, comme je vous ay dit, par cet amour, vous vous y verriez aussi” (1: 93-94).

Martine Debaisieux notes a similar revelation of underlying layers in the oil painting of the “bourgeois en paysan cocu,” upon which figures the depiction in water colors —easily wiped away— of the “bourgeois présomptueux” in Le Berger extravagant (13). Debaisieux contends that the subversive “couche” of the painting is analogous to the monkey that wreaks havoc in the opening scene of Francion, and that anamorphic procedures inform the instability of the sign in Sorel’s works.

“S’il ne m’est pas permis de voir vostre visage / Ces beaux traits pour le moins / Serviront de tesmoings, / Que privé de mon vray bien, ce bien faux me soulage” (2: 187).

Referring to the Logique de Port-Royal, Foucault notes that the first example of the sign provided by Arnauld is the drawing or painting: “C’est qu’en effet le tableau n’a pour contenu que ce qu’il représente, et pourtant ce contenu n’apparaît que représenté par une représentation. La disposition binaire du signe . . . suppose que le signe est une représentation dédoublée et redoublée sur elle-même” (79).

A divining oracle seems to promise Adamas life-long felicity upon the reunion of Céladon and Astrée (2: 314). Though the inherent worth of the shepherd already inspires Adamas’ nascent affection, the Druid’s own stake in the matter propels his helping hand: “depuis la responce de l’Oracle, il y fut bien davantage poussé pour son propre sujet, faisant bien paroistre qu’une personne interessée s’employe plus soigneusement quel celle qui n’est touché que du devoir” (2: 314).

After their first encounter with Alexis, the shepherdesses confirm Lycidas’ initial impression, using identical metaphors to describe the Druidess’ resemblance to Céladon. Phyllis remarks: “j’avoue n’avoir jamais veu portraict ressembler plus à celuy pour qui il a esté fait,” and Diane adds, “dites encore davantage, . . . que ne vistes jamais miroir representer plus naifvement le visage qui luy est devant” (3: 239). The mirror, the point of separation between onlooker and image projected, vanishes, as the feigned Alexis and her representation become one and the same.
Works cited or consulted


